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ABSTRACT. We analyze the problem of determining inventory and pricing decisions in a two-period

retail setting when an opportunity to refine information about uncertain demand is available. The model
extends the newsvendor problem with pricing by allowing for multiple suppliers, the pooling of
procurement resources, and more general informational dynamics. One contribution is the solution
procedure: we show that all decisions (up to seven in ali, including recourse decisions) can be
determined uniquely as a function of a surrogate first-period decision called the stocking factor. Hence,
the two-period decision problem with recourse reduces to a search for one .decision variable. A second
contribution is the policy implications: we find that the cost oflearning is (I) a consequence of
censored information because, on the margin, learning is free if full information is guaranteed; (2)
measured in the form of an increased stocking factor; and (3) shared with the consumer in. the form of a
higher selling price when demand uncertainty is additive. A third contribution is the application of the
results to three motivating examples: A market research problem in which a product is introduced in a
test market prior to a widespread launch; a global newsvendor problem in which a seasonal product is
sold in two different countries with non-overlapping selling seasons; and a minimum-quantity
commitment problem in which procurement resources for multiple purchases may be pooled.

In October 1999, The New York Times reported that Coca-Cola Co. was conducting a field test to adjust
prices dynamically based on anticipated demand patterns and stock availability (Hays, 1999). Then, in
May 2000, Coca-Cola Co. issued a press release announcing their intention to invest $100 million to
link more than a half-million vending machines worldwide through intelligent vending technology.
According to the press release, "Intelligent vending is expected to substantially improve inventory
management, and deliver superb service to customers and a quality purchase experience to consumers."
In time, Coca-Cola Co. expects to provide cashless vending, coupons, and Internet browsing.

Coca-Cola's initiatives into intelligent vending underscore the observation that information about one
retail market can improve operating efficacy in related markets. A natural consequence of this
dependency is that a goal in the first market is to invest in learning by controlling inventory and pricing
decisions, even if such a goal comes at the expense of not maximizing local profits. The intuition is that
learning can lead to improvements in future markets that ultimately produce higher system-wide profits.

The following three illustrations further highlight the natural role that information gathered in one
market can play to enhance decision making in a related market separated in time, in space, or in both.
The first example is reminiscent of the recent market test by Frito-Lay, Inc. of WOW!™, its line of
snacks made with its fat-free cooking oil, Olean, before a national launch (Frito-Lay, Inc., 1997). It also
is similar to market tests conducted regularly by retailers (Lilien et al., 1992). The second example is a
generalization of a recent two-period model by Kouvelis and Gutierrez (1997). And the third example is
an extension of a multi-period decision problem due to Bassok and Anupindi (1997).

Exaniple 1. Test Market
A firm introduces a new product in a test market prior to a widespread launch. Before
the start of the test, the firm's decisions include: (1) how much st6ck to supply for the
test market and (2) what selling price to set in the test market. Then, after observing
sales in the test market, the firm can: (3) refine its estimate of the potential market size
of the overall market, (4) detennine how much stock to supply for the overall market, and
(5) reassess its pricing policy for the overall market.
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Example 2. Global Newsvendor
A firm sells a seasonal product with uncertain demand in two countries with nonoverlapping selling seasons. Before the start of the first selling season, the firm's
decisions include: (1) how much stock to supply to the first country's market, (2) how
much stock to commit to the second country's market, and (3) what selling price to set in
the first country's market. Then, after observing sales in the first country's market, the
firm can: (4) refine its estimate of the potential market size of the second country's
market, (5) determine how much of any unsold inventory from the first country's market
to transship to the second country's market, (6) decide how much stock to procure from a
premium-priced supplier for the second country's market, and (7) set a selling price for
the second country's market. Note that revenue generated in the second country's market
will be subject to exchange rate risk.
Example 3. Supply Contracts with Minimum Quantity Commitment
A firm commits to a long-term contract specifying a minimum total quantity amount that
will be purchased over the course of a multi-period selling season. Before the start of the
first period, the firm's decisions include: (I) how much stock to commit to each period
of the selling season and (2) the selling price of the product. Then, at the end of each
period, after observing sales, the firm can: (3) refine its estimate of the potential market
size for the upcoming period, (4) determine how much stock to procure at a premium
·
price to supplement its available stock, and (5) adjust its selling price.

The goal o( this paper is to develop a modeling framework that captures the essential features of these
three examples and to use that framework to answer a variety of questions that arise naturally. For
example: How can optimal pricing and inventory decisions be determined when recourse is available?
Should price be increased today because there is an opportunity to learn about tomorrow's market?
Likewise, should inventory investment be increased? To that end, we define a two-period extension to
the newsvendor problem with pricing by allowing for multiple suppliers and more general informational
dynamics. The framework is defined by the following sequence of events and decisions:

Step (la): Before the beginning of period I, determine how much to buy from a supplier for delivery in
period 1 and in period 2, respectively. This is equivalent to making a commitment to
purchase a specific amount over the life of a 2-period contract.
Step (lb ): Also before the beginning of period 1, determine the price at which to sell the product. This
implies that the firm can affect market demand through its retail selling price. Demand
uncertainty is introduced in an additive manner, which means that price influences expected
demand, but not demand variance. We assume that price and demand are inversely related so
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that increases in price correspond to decreases in demand. Thus, for a given level of stocking
quantity, an increase in price results in a lower likelihood of stock-outs.
Step (2):

Observe the sales in period 1 and then exploit that information by refining the
characterization of the demand uncertainty prescribed for the second period. We assume
unobservable lost sales: If there is inventory left over from period 1, then sales corresponds
to demand, which implies that full information is available to update demand uncertainty in
period 2. But, if there is no inventory left over from period 1, then sales provides censored
information regarding demand, which implies that incomplete information is available to
update demand uncertainty in period 2. Raising the stocking quantity, the selling price, or
both in period 1 increases the likelihood of obtaining full information.

Step (3):

Given the refined estimate for demand in period 2, determine the stocking quantity and
selling price for period 2. Note that the stocking quantity decision was made tentatively at
the beginning of period 1 (Step 1a). However three alternatives for recourse exist at the
beginning of period 2: a portion of the original procurement quantity can be discarded rather
than stocked for retail sale, some or all of any inventory left over from period 1 can be held
for (or transferred to) period 2, and supplemental stock can be purchased at a premium price.
Note also that if the second market is foreign, then the unit revenue in terms of the home
currency is uncertain because of exchange rate fluctuations.

The timing of these events naturally leads to the formulation of the decision problem as a two-stage
stochastic program with recourse (where each time period of our model constitutes a "stage"). In our
model, Steps 1a and 1b correspond to the first stage, Step 3 corresponds to the second stage, and Step 2
provides information that links the two stages. Our model makes a contribution to the literature in
several ways. First, we extend the newsvendor problem with pricing by incorporating more general
informational dynamics and, in effect, multiple suppliers. Second, we incorporate retail pricing and
informational dynamics into the global newsvendor problem of Kouvelis and Gutierrez (1997) and into
the minimum quantity commitment model of Bassok and Anupindi

(1997~.

Finally, by incorporating

aspects of marketing, economics, and finance, we show how an interdisciplinary approach to traditional
operations management problems can improve the quality of decision-making.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 positions this paper in relation to the
existing literature. Then, in Section 2, we develop the formal mathematical model. In analyzing the
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model, we follow a standard approach of working backwards: First we solve the recourse problem as
though all relevant input parameters have already been updated based on the first period's decisions and
observations (Section 3); then we identify mechanisms for using information 'Obtained from the first
period to update the input parameters used in the recourse problem (Section 4); and finally, exploiting
the foresight of how parameters will be updated and the recourse problem solved based on the events of
period I, we solve the first-stage decision problem and examine the benefits of linking related markets
together rather than treating them as being independent (Section 5). The results of our analysis will
show that this complex problem with up to seven decision variables reduces to a search for one decision:
the optimal stocking factor (which we define in Section 2) for the first period. Moreover, our results
will indicate that much of the insight regarding the impact that transferring information and inventory
between retail markets has on operational decision making can be explained within the context of the
optimal stocking factor. We discuss the applicability and scope of our results in Section 6.

1

RELATIONSlllPTO THELITERATURE

The model developed in this paper spans several streams of literature. One such stream is the literature
on the price-setting newsvendor problem. Petruzzi and Dada (1999a) provide an integrative review of
this problem; however it can be described succinctly as follows: given economic parameters and a
distribution function to characterize demand, a stocking quantity and a selling price must be determined
before the price-dependent, uncertain demand for a single period is realized. Although this construct is
fundamental to our recourse problem, the analysis developed here is more general. In effect, the
recourse problem analyzed in this paper can be thought of as a multiple-supplier, price-setting
newsvendor problem because the stocking quantity made available for the second stage of our two-stage
problem originates from as many as three available sources: the amount of stock committed to prior to
the beginning of the fust period represents the frrst source; the random amount of stock left over from
the fust period represents the second source; and the amount that can be ordered at a price premium
represents the third source.
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From the perspective of a manager about to make the recourse decisions, the per-unit "purchase" cost
associated with the first source is zero because the investment in this stock is sunk, committed to a
period earlier. However, the supply of this stock is .constrained, limited to the decision made a period
earlier. In addition, to this manager, the per-unit purchase cost associated with the. second source is the
cost of transshipping a unit of stock from market 1 to market 2, if applicable. The supply of this stock
·also is limited, constrained by the realized value of the random number of leftovers resulting from the
first period's operations. We assume that the supply of stock available at a price premium is unlimited;
however, presumably, the per-unit purchase cost associated with it is strictly .greater than the
corresponding cost of either of the other two supply sources.
A second stream of literature is that on dynamic inventory models with pricing and stochastic demand.
As in Ernst (1970), Zabel (1972), Alpern and Snower (1988), Thowsen (1975), and Petruzzi and Dada
(1999b ), leftover inventory is available for sale in subsequent periods, but demand in excess of supply is
lost. However, the informational dynamics in our two-period model are more general. We explicitly
incorporate mechanisms for refining the characterization of demand uncertainty based on the
observation of previous sales. Neither Ernst, Zabel, nor Thowsen incorporate updating procedures in his
model; and, Alpern and Snower and Petruzzi and Dada each investigate a variant of a more specific case
in which the possibility exists to resolve uncertainty completely.
A third stream of literature is that on stochastic inventory theory with unobservable lost sales. Recall,
step 2 in our model calls for the refinement of the second-period demand distribution based on the
observation of first-period sales. This modeling specification leads to censored information because,
generally speaking, the number of sales in any given period cannot exceed the smaller of demand and
supply for the period. As a result, the observation of sales in a stock-out situation provides only a lower·
bound for the actual demand that occurs. To avoid censored demand information, both sales and
shortages must be recorded; but, in many cases, the observation and recording of each occurrence of
unfilled demand simply is not practical.
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Relevant papers appearing either in the operations management or the economics literature address only
aspects of the learning model employed in this paper. In particular, Lariviere and Porteus (1999);
Krouse and Senchack (1977); Harpaz et al. (1982); Braden and Freimer (1991); Nahmias (1993); and
Agrawal and Smith (1996) incorporate the idea of learning from censored information into inventory
models, but they assume that the selling price is given rather than incorporate it as a decision variable.
On the other hand, Grossman et al. (1977); Lazear (1986); Balvers and Cosimano (1990); Trefler
(1993); and Braden and Oren (1994) develop economic models for learning the demand curve, but they
assume that the stocking quantity is given rather than incorporate it as a decision variable.

A fourth stream of literature is that on procurement models with recourse. This literature has become
vast in recent years, thanks to the explosive interest in supply chain management. We provide only
representative samples of related models here and refer the reader to Tayur, Ganeshan, and Magazine
(1999) for a more comprehensive treatment. Briefly stated, models of this type investigate
postponement strategies in which a buyer retains procurement flexibility by placing a tentative order
with a supplier only to adjust that order at a later time once more accurate market information becomes
available. Academic interest typically is in the development of contract parameters defining the degree
of flexibiiity afforded to the buyer and in the "price" of flexibility; that is, in the form and amount of
compensation provided by the buyer to the supplier in exchange for the flexibility to the adjust the
procurement amount. Common subject headings appearing in this literature include accurate response
(e.g., Fisher and Raman, 1996); backup agreements (e.g., Eppen and Iyer, 1997); buyback or returns
policies (e.g., Emmons and Gilbert, 1998); minimum quantity commitments (e.g., Bassok and Anupindi,
1997); quantity flexibility (e.g., Tsay and Lovejoy, 1999); quick response (lyer and Bergen, 1997); and
global sourcing (Kouvelis and Gutierrez, 1997).
Kouvelis and Gutierrez (1997) were particularly influential in the development of our model. They
develop a profit-maximizing strategy for an international firm that sells a fashion good in two, nonoverlapping markets. In their model, Kouvelis and Gutierrez incorporate foreign exchange risk and
provide the alternative of transferring to the second market some portion of the leftovers remaining from
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the first market; however, they assume that the selling price for each market is given and that the
demand distribution is not updated between periods. Kouvelis and Gutierrez focus primarily on
devising a wholesale pricing scheme for the transfer of inventory between the two markets so as to find
an efficient allocation of profit between the players participating in the two markets. We focus instead
on a retail pricing scheme for the transfer of infonnation between the two markets so as to optimize the
coordinated profit generated by the two markets combined.

2

FORMULATION OF TilE Two-PERIOD STOCHASTIC PROGRAM

Consider a single firm that operates in two retail markets. The firm offers the same product for sale in
both markets, but the selling seasons are non-overlapping. Consequently, the firm can transfer some or
all of the leftovers remaining from the first market to the second market for possible sale in the second
selling season. In addition, the respective market demand functions, each of which are stochastic, price
dependent, and include an uncertain intercept term, are related due to homogenous customer
preferences. As a result, the firm can revise its characterization of the unknown demand parameter
applicable to the second market by gathering information about demand in the first market and then
transferring that information to the second market The firm's objective is to maximize the total
expected profit generated by the two markets; it's controls are the stocking quantity and the retail selling
price for each of the two markets.

We define the following basic notation for our model:
i

= 1,2:

index identifying the first and second retail markets, respectively; or equivalently, index
identifying the first and second selling periods, respectively.
per-unit selling price of stock available for retail sale in market i.

Q:

quantity ordered at the beginning of period I (from an outside supplier), but not received
until the beginning of period 2.
· amount of Q that is stocked for retail sale in market 2 (q 1 represents a recourse decision;
q 1 < Q indicates a recourse decision to discard Q- q 1 units rather than to make them
available for retail sale in market 2).
quantity remaining at the end of period I (from operations in market I) that is carried into
period 2 and stocked for retail sale in market 2.
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q2:

quantity purchased (from an outside supplier) at the beginning of period 2 that is stocked
for retail sale in market 2.

Si:

stocking quantity made available for retail sale in market i (S 1 is ordered and purchased
from an outside supplier at the beginning of period I; S2,;, q1 + q12 + q2).

Ci:

per-unit purchase cost associated with stock ordered at the beginning of period i.

c 12:

per-unit transshipment cost associated with transferring stock left over from market I to
market 2 (applies only if markets are separated in space as, for example, in the global
newsvendor problem).

hi:

per-unit holding cost attributed to inventory left over in period i.

Ei:

random variable representing the uncertainty associated with the demand function
corresponding to market i.

D(pbEi):

uncertain, price-dependent demand function corresponding to market i.

1-i:

number of leftovers from market i (Li = max {Si - D(pbEi), 0) ).

£:

realized number of leftovers from market I; this establishes the maximum amount of
inventory that can be transferred from market I to market 2.

t:

sufficient statistic representing information obtained during the first selling season and
used to update the characterization of e2; this information is deduced from f.

!lh J.t2(t):

expected value of e1 and E2 (given the information t), respectively.

F 1(.), F2(.Jt):

distribution function associated with e1 and E2 (given the information t), respectively.

f 1(.), f2(.Jt):

density function associated with E1 and E2 (given the information t),respectively.

We assume that the firm commits to procurement quantities for both markets at the beginning of the first
selling season, although additional units can be procured for the second market at the beginning of
period 2, if necessary. We do not require that the firm receive both its procurement quantities ordered at
the beginning of the first selling season, only that it establish at that time a contractual arrangement
governing the specified amount to be delivered at the start of each selling season. One motivation for
this restriction is the desire to establish a modeling framework for a firm that negotiates a cost discount
schedule by bringing larger procurement quantities to the bargaining tab!~. Correspondingly, we
assume c 1 < c2, regardless of whether units purchased for c2 are procured from the same supplier as the
units purchased for c1 or from a separate supplier altogether. Moreover, we assume that c 12 < c2 because
otherwise, it would not be economically sensible to transfer any leftovers from market I to market 2.
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We assume no penalty cost for a lost sale other than forfeited profit. That is, we let the per-unit·
goodwill cost of a shortage equal zero. We justify this assumption in two ways. First, each of the two
markets has only one selling season; consequently, goodwill cost has little meaning. Second, the firm is
a price-setter. This means that the firm affects demand by changing its selling price. Therefore, the lost
goodwill resulting in an unsatisfied demand can be thought of within the context of the parameters of
the demand function. Note, however, a per-unit cost of goodwill can be included explicitly in the model
without changing the structure of the results. Similarly, we assume that the cost of discarding a unit is
zero and that there is no salvage value. Again, either a per-unit discarding cost or a per-unit salvage
value can be included without difficulty.

We characterize demand for each market as a decreasing linear function of Pi and include the unknown
parameter, Ei, as an additive term: D(pi,Ei) =ai ~ biPi + Ei. We assume that Ei > 0. Moreover, we assume
that £1 and £2 are related such that the information transferred from the first selling season to the second
selling season can be obtained by observing the number of leftovers occurring in market 1. In
particular: If leftovers remain at the end of the first selling season (i.e., if L1

= S1- D(pi>E 1) > O),.then

market 1 sales equals market 1 demand, which implies that the realized value of £1 can be deduced: £1 =

+

S1 - a 1 b1P1 - L1. In this case, the realized value of £1 represents the information obtained during the
first selling season (i.e., if the realized value of £1 can be deduced, then t

=EJ).

This information then

can be used to update the demand distribution for market 2: F2(.jt) = Fz(.jEJ). If no leftovers remain at
the end of the first selling season (i.e., if L1

=0), then market 1 sales does not equal market 1 demand,

which implies that the realized value of £1 cannot be deduced. However, a lower bound for E~o which we
denote as zh can be deduced: z 1 = S 1 - a1 + b 1p 1. In this case, the lower bound for £1 represents the
information obtained during the first selling season (i.e., if the realized value of £1 cannot be deduced,
then t = z~o where z1 provides a lower bound for £1). This information then can be used to update the
demand distribution for market 2: Fz(.jt)

=F2(.jz1).

We introduce a specific technique for using tto

derive F 2(.jt) in Section 4.
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Regardless of the events occurring during the first selling season, the decisions that are made at the
beginning of the second selling season are made in the presence of uncertainty. However, because e2 is
related to Et. the characterization of that uncertainty can be honed by using information revealed during
the first selling season. Such information comes in one of two possible forms, depending on whether or
not leftovers remain at the conclusion of the first selling season: If leftovers remain, then t = Et. which
represents an example of full (or complete) information being transferred from market 1 to market 2. If
leftovers do not remain, then t = z1 represents an example of censored information being transferred
from market 1 to market 2. We refer to the quantity,

Z;,

defined in general as

Z;

= Si - ai + biPh as the

stocking factor associated with selling season i (Petruzzi and Dada, 1999a). It is a convenient measure
because a simple comparison between Z; and Ei yields the number of leftovers in selling season i:

~

=

max{zi- Ei. 0}.

Next, we present our model formally. Let:
1t

= maximum expected profit associated with the two-period problem.

Il(Q,z1Jt) = maximum expected profit associated with the recourse problem when Q is the
procurement quantity for market 2 committed to prior to the first selling season, z 1 is the
stocking factor associated with market 1, and tis the information obtained during the first
selling season.

At the beginning of the first selling season, Q units are ordered for delivery at the beginning of the
second selling season at a cost of c1 each. Although these units are not available for sale in market 1
and, perhaps, are not paid for until the beginning of the second selling season, the decision must be
made at the beginning of the first season. Thus, we account for their cost in period 1. Also at the
beginning of the first selling season, 81 units are purchased at a cost of c1 each. These units are stocked
for sale in market 1. Each unit sold in market 1 generates a revenue of PI. and each unit left over creates
a holding cost of h 1. Then, at the beginning of the second selling season, 8 2 units are stocked for sale in
market 2. Of the Sz units stocked, q 1 units are acquired at no additional marginal cost (the "purchase"
cost associated with q 1 is zero because the investment in this stock is sunk, committed to a period
earlier), but q 1 is restricted by Q, the quantity ordered one period earlier; q 12 units are acquired for a
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marginal cost of c 12 each, but q 12 is restricted byL1

=max{z1- E~oO}, the random number ofleftovers

remaining at the end of the first selling season; and qz units are purchased for a marginal cost of Cz each
(there is no capacity limitation for q2). Each unit sold in market 2 generates a revenue of pz and each
unit left over creates a holding cost of h 2. Thus, using the identity sales = stocking quantity -leftovers
and applying the definitions S2 = q1 + qn + qz and Z;

= S;- a; + b;p; fori = 1 and 2, we can write:
(1)

where,
(2)

and
(3)

In (1), the expression in brackets represents the expected profit attributed to the decisions made at the
beginning of the first selling season, and E[TI(Q,zJ)] represents the expected profit attributed to the
second selling season, which is based on the understanding that information obtained from market 1 is
transferred to market 2 and that an optimal policy then is followed in market 2. In (2) and (3), t denotes
the information obtained in market 1 and transferred to market 2: If leftovers remain at the end of the
first selling season, then t denotes the realized value of E1 that is inferred; if leftovers do not remain, then
t denotes the lower bound for E1 that is inferred (namely, ZJ). In either case, R.

=Z1 - t indicates the

realized number of leftovers from market 1, which establishes the maximum number of units available
for transfer to market 2.

The objective is to solve (1) and thereby determine the optimal decision policy for market l, which we
denote as (p1*,S 1*,Q*). However, solving (I) requires the computation of (2), which requires first
solving (3), the recourse problem. Thus, solving (1) requires the determination of the conditional
optimal decision policy for market 2, which depends on t, the information obtained during the first
selling season. We denote the conditional optimal decision policy for market 2 as (pz* ,qJ*,q!2*,qz*).
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3

ANALYSIS OF THE RECOURSE PROBLEM

In this section, we analyze the recourse problem using a two-step procedure: First, we determine
(pz*,qJ*,q1z*,qz*), the conditionally-optimal solution to (3), given t, the information obtained during the
first selling season; and second, we compute (2), the expected profit associated with the solution to (3),
by un-conditiouing on t. Then, we incorporate foreign exchange risk into the analysis to demonstrate
the recourse problem as an extension to the global newsvendor problem. And, we close with a
discussion of the more general applicability of the recourse solution.
Detertnining the Recourse Decisions
Since the manager making the recourse decisions has three distinct sources from which to establish the
desired stocking quantity for market 2, the recourse decision problem can be viewed as a three-supplier
generalization of the news vendor problem with pricing. Recall that the stocking quantity for market 2 is
S2 = q1 + q 1z + q2. The quantity q2 is purchased from a supplier who has unlimited capacity. The
constant marginal cost of these units is c2. The quantity q1z is purchased from a "supplier" who has
random capacity L1. although the value of L1 is realized prior to the determination of q12 . (L1 refers to
the number of leftovers from market 1.) The constant marginal cost of these units is c12• Finally, the
quantity q 1 is purchased from a supplier who has fixed capacity Q. The constant marginal cost of these
units is co. (In the recourse problem described in Section 2, co= 0. However, we introduce co here to
complete the generalization.) Recall, the right to purchase up to Q units from this supplier is purchased
for c1 Q prior to the start of the fitst selling season.
Given this generalized description, (3) can be written as follows:
ll(Q,zJit)= maxp2 ,q1,q12 .q 2 R{pz,qi,qi z•qzlt)

(4)

s.t. qi:SQ
qlz :SL1

where,
(5)

and, recall:

12

Sz =

q1 + q12 + qz

(6)

zz =

Sz -az + bzpz

(7)

LJ =

Z1 -t

(8)

0 = Co < C12 < Cz

(9)

Relationship (9) establishes a preference among sources of stock for market 2. Strictly speaking, there
may be no preference between the source that charges the per-unit cost co and the source that charges the
per-unit cost c12 (if c12 =co= 0); however this would represent a degenerate case in which the threesupplier generalization collapses to a two-supplier generalization. In such a case, one source of supply
would charge cz and would have unlimited capacity, and the other source of supply would charge c 0 =
c12 and would have a capacity limit of Q + L1 units. Since the analysis of the two-supplier
generalization is analogous to the analysis of the three-supplier generalization, we assume that the
preference between c 0 and c 12 is strict. Thus, (9) implies that no units should be acquired at a per-unit
cost of c 1z unless Q units are acquired at a per-unit cost of co; and, no units should be acquired at a perunit cost of Cz unless L1 units are acquired at a per-unit cost of c12.

In other words, in determining how many units should be acquired for market 2 from each of the three
sources of supply, it is sufficient to choose only S 2, the total stocking quantity. We state this
observation formally as Lemma 1.

LEMMA 1.

Given a choice for Sz, the optimal allocation ofthis stocking quantity among the three
sources of stock is:

This result leads to Lemma 2, the proof for which is in the appendix.

LEMMA2.

Given t, the optimal selling price and the optimal stocking quantity for market 2 can be
determined as functions of zz as follows:
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*IS

(z It)- a2 +z2 -'-A2(z2 1t)-b2h2 F2(z21t )
=
2 - P2 2
b2[1+Fz (z21 t)]
-

(a)

P2

(b)

S 2 *1z 2

= S 2 (z 2 1t)

J: F (x

where A 2 (z 2 1t) =

2

2

2

A 2 (z 2 1t) + (a 2 + b 2h 2 + z 2 )Fz (z 2 1t)
1+Fz(z 2 1t)
1t)dx 2 represents the expected number ofleftove rs in

market2.
Lemma 2(a) provides a simple prescription for computing the optimal selling price for market 2, if a
value for Sz is given. One interesting property of this prescription is that pz*ISz can be expressed solely
as a function of z 2, the stocking factor for market 2. Given this property, the stocking quantity for
market 2 also can be expressed as a function of the market 2 stocking factor (Lemma 2(b)).
Thus, the problem of determining (pz*,qJ*,qJ2*,qz*), the optimal decision vector for the second selling
period, reduces to an optimization problem over a single variable. Specifically, (4) can be transformed
into a problem written strictly as a function of zz:
TI(Q,zJ!t )=maxz 2 R(zzlt)
(10)

s.t. q 1(zz It) S Q
ql2 (zzl t) s L1

where,

and where Cjj(Zzlt) is short for CJi(Sz(zzlt)), for j = 1, 12, and 2. Let zz* denote the solution to (10). Then
the optimal recourse policy can be recovered as follows: from Lemma 2(a), p 2 * = p 2(zz*lt) and, from
Lemma 1, (qJ*,q!2*,qz*) = (qJ(Sz(zz*lt)), qJz(Sz(zz*lt}}, qz(Sz(zz*lt))), where Sz(zz*lt) is obtained from
Lemma2 (b).
To solve (10) and thus, to determine z 2*, we establish and interpret a series oflemma s, the proofs for
which are provided in the appendix.
LEMMA3.

There exists a zz, say ZQ, that is such that Sz(zzlt) <: Q if and only if zz < ZQ. Likewise,
there exists a Zz, say ZQ+t.. that is such that Sz(zzlt) < Q + L1 if and only if zz < ZQ+L·
Moreover, ZQ :O; ZQ+L·
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LEMMA4.

Define M(zzlt) = [pz(zzlt) + hz)[l - Fz(zzlt)]. If
(a) az > bzcz; and
(b) dgz(zz!t)ldzz + 2gz(zz!ti > 0, where gz(zzlt)
associated with e2;

= fz(zzlt)l[l-Fz(zzlt)] is the hazard rate

then, there exists a z2, say zm, that is such that M(zzlt) > cz + hz ~ zz < zm; there exists a
zz, say zu, that is such that M(zzlt) > c12 + hz ~ Zz < zu; and there exists a zz, say z,, that
is such that M(zzlt) > co+ hz ~ zz < z,. Moreover, zm < Zn < z,.

Lemmas 3 and 4 provide mathematical properties useful for solving (1 0). In addition, Lemma 2
introduces conditions to ensure tractability: Condition (a) provides some assurance that market 2
demand is positive. And, Condition (b) establishes a tractability test for the recourse problem. It will be
satisfied, for example, if Ez is characterized by a distribution having a non-decreasing hazard rate.
Distributions having a non-decreasing hazard rate are commonplace (see Barlow and Proschan, 1965,
for examples); however, it is not enough simply to assume at the onset that F 2(.!t) is such a distribution.
This is because F 2(.!t) is not constructed until after information is gathered from the first selling season.
Moreover, F 2(.!t) depends on the type of information gathered (full or censored). As a result, the
properties ofF2(.!t) are sensitive to the specific construct by which E1 and Ez are related. For now, we
assume that Condition (b) holds so that we may proceed; and then, in Section 4, we identify conditions
to assure that this assumption is valid.

Next, we note from Lemma 3 that, for a given t,

ZQ

!> ZQ+L· And, we note from Lemma 4 that, for a

given t, zm < zu < z,. However, zz* and consequently, the optimal recourse policy (pz*,q,*,q,z*,qz*)
depends on how ZQ+L and ZQ are related to z~, zu, and zm. We tabulate the possibilities and the
corresponding results in Lemma 5. The technical details are provided in the appendix.
LEMMA 5.

Let:
R 1 (z 2 i t)= (p 2 (z 2 1t) -c 0 )s 2 (z 2 1t)- (p 2 (z 2 1t) + hz)A 2 (z 2 1t)
R n (zzl t)= (pz (zzit)- CJz )sz (zzi t)- (pz (zzl t) + hz )Az (zzit) + (clz -co )Q
Rm(z 2 it)= (p 2 (z 2 it)- c 2 )s 2 (z 2 it)- (p 2 (z 2 jt) + h 2 )A 2 (z 2 jt) + (cz -co)Q + (cz -cl2)Ll

Then, zz* and the corresponding conditionally-optimal expected recourse profit can be
computed as follows:
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IF ...

THEN,Z2*=

AND, Il(Q,ziit) =

ZQ+L<zm

zm

Rm(zmlt)

Zm < ZQ+L < Zn

ZQ+L

Rn(ZQ+dt)

ZQ<zn<ZQ+L

zu

Rn(znlt)

Zn < ZQ < ZJ

ZQ

RI(zoJt)

z1 <zQ

ZI

RI(ZIIt)

Together, Lemmas 1-5 imply a procedure for solving the recourse problem optimally. Next, we
summarize this conditionally-opti mal policy, as well as the procedure for determining it. Then, we
interpret and discuss the policy.
THEOREM 1.

If, for a given t, conditions (a) and (b) ofLemma4 are satisfied, then (p2*,q 1*,q12*,q2*),
the conditionally-opti mal recourse policy, can be determined as follows:

Y' Obtain t from market 1 and use it to construct S2(z2lt) from Lemma 2(b) and M(z2lt)
from Lemma 4. Also, use it to determine L 1 from (8).

2"d Compute ZQ, ZQ+L. ZI. zn. and zm as the unique solutions to S 2(zQit) = Q, S2(ZQ+dt) =
Q + L1. M(zmlt) = c2+h2, M(zult) = c12+h2, and M(zdt) = co+h2, respectively.

3'd Sort ZQ, ZQ+L. ZI. zu, and zm, and then determine z2* from Lemma 5.

4'h Compute S 2* and P2* from Lemma 2 as follows:
Ifz2* =

Then,S2* =

And,p2* =

zm

b 2 {p 2* -c 2 )+ A 2 (zm I t)

h ) F2 (zml t)
(
c2 + c2 + 2
1-F2 (zm It)
.
a2 +zQ+L -(Q+LI)

ZQ+L

Q+L1

zu

b2 (p2* -c12 )+ A2 (zrr I t)

b2
· h ) F2 (zu I t)
(
cl2 + cl2 + 2 1-F2(zu It)
a 2 +zQ -Q

ZQ

Q

ZJ

b 2 {p 2* -co)+ A 2 (z 1 It)

b2
h ) F2 (z1 It)
(
co+ co+ 2
1- F2 (z 1 It)

5'h Compute qi*.q12*,and q2* from Lemma 1 as follows: q1* = min{S2*,Q}. q12* =
min{S2*,Q+LI} -q1*, and q2* = S2*- q1* -q2*·
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In summary, z~. zn, zm.

ZQ,

and ZQ+L can be computed and sorted only after tis obtained from market 1.

Then, depending on the results of the sorting, zz*, the conditionally-optimal stocking factor for market
2, can be determined from Lemma 5. Once zz* is determined, the conditionally-optimal recourse policy
can be recovered by applying Lemmas 1 and 2. The five scenarios correspond, in effect, to the
"goodness" with which market 2 demand is estimated at the start of the first selling season. For
example, the scenario ZQ ~ z1 corresponds to the situation in which market 2 demand initially is
overestimated by a significant amount. In this scenario, the response to learning that market 2 demand
is smaller than estimated is to discard all of the leftovers from market I and to discard a portion of Q,
the amount initially procured for market 2. The corresponding "cost" of making this initial
overestimation of market 2 demand is the purchase cost initially paid for the units that ultimately are
discarded rather than made available for sale. This type of cost is analogous to paying insurance
premiums on a policy for which no claim is ever submitted.

At the other end of the spectrum, the scenario ZQ+L:::;; zm corresponds to the situation in which market 2
demand initially is underestimated by a significant amount. In this scenario, the response to learning
that market 2 demand is larger than estimated is not only to supplement Q with all of the leftovers from
market 1, but also to augment that sum with enough additional units to bring the stocking quantity for
market 2 up to Sz(zmlt). The corresponding "cost" of making the initial underestimation of market 2
demand is the incremental purchase cost of the extra units at the premium price. This type of cost is
analogous to having out-of-pocket expenses exceed the maximum coverage of an insurance policy.

Another interesting observation from Theorem 1 is the following set of interpretations regarding the
optimal recourse selling price and stocking quantity: The "desired" selling price is a price that includes
a mark-up over the marginal cost of purchasing the next unit, where the mark-up is set equal to the
marginal cost of having the next unit be left over (Cj + hz) times the "odds" that the next unit will be left
over. (Since Fz(zz*it) denotes the probability of having the next unit be left over and 1 - Fz(zz*it)
denotes the probability of having the next unit not be left over, we interpret the ratio of Fz(z2*it) to 1 F 2 (z2*it) as the odds that the next unit will be left over.) The corresponding desired stocking quantity is
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the amount that equates expected sales (Sz*- Az(zz*lt)) to bz times the optimal mark-up in price (pz*Cj).

However, if the decision maker is constrained not to operate at one of the desired price/quantity

combinations, then the "consolation" selling price is the price that clears the existing inventory.

Computing the Expected Profit of the Recourse Problem
In the previous subsection, we demonstrated how to determine the optimal recourse policy and the
associated expected profit for the second selling period, for

agiven t.

However, t represents information

obtained from market 1's operations and hence, does not become available until the conclusion of the
first selling period. Since we are interested not only in behaving optimally in the second selling period,
but also in behaving optimally in the first selling period given the understanding that an optimal course
of action will be followed in the second selling period based on the information obtained from the first,
we need to consider in expectation what will occur in the second selling period. In other words, to
determine the optimal course of action for the first selling period, we need to consider E[II(Q,z1)],
which, given (2),can be obtained from Lemma 5 by un-conditioning on t.
Computing E[II(Q,z1)] can be quite difficult because, given Q and

ZJ.

it involves ,for every possible

value oft: (1) running through the procedure detailed in Theorem 1 and using the output to generate
II(Q,zllt), and then (2) weighting the obtained value of II(Q,z1lt) by the likelihood that twill take the
value used in the iteration. However, we need not make such detailed computations here. 1n this
subsection, we ascertain analytical properties ofE[II(Q ,zJ)] that will prove useful (in Section 5) for
analyzing the first-period decision problem and for developing insight based on that analysis.
From (8), t = z1 - L 1 represents information that is based on the number of leftovers remaining at the
conclusion of the first selling season. But, recall that L1 = max{z1 -

E1.

Of.

Thus, for any realized value

of EJ. say X1, we get t =min{ z~oxd. And, from t, the optimal recourse policy can be determined
according to Theorem 1 and then the corresponding optimal expected profit can be determined
according to Lemma 5.
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Consider, then, conditioning on the event E1 = x 1. If x1 < Zt, then t = X1 (in other words, if x1 < z~, then
x 1 is observable). In this case, the realized number ofleftovers is£= Z1- X1 > 0. This implies that Q +
£ = Q + (z1 - x1) > Q and hence, Lemma 5 indicates five possible alternatives for Il(Q,z1 I t = z1):
ZQ+z,-:x, <
- Zm

Rm(Zm I xl)

I"f

Rn(ZQ+z,-x, I x 1 )

if z 111 < zQ+z,-x, < Zn

II(Q,z 1 1t = x 1) = Ru(zu I x 1)

I"f

ZQ _< Zn -< ZQ+z,-x,

RJ(ZQ I XI)

if Zn < ZQ < z 1

RJ(ZJ I XI)

if ZJ :::; ZQ

(12)

If x1 2: Zt, then t = z 1 (in other words, if x 1 2: Zt, then X1 is not observable). In this case, the realized
number of leftovers is £ = 0. This implies that Q + £ = Q and hence, Table I indicates three possible
alternatives for II(Q,z 1 I t = z 1) instead of five:
R III (zm I z 1 )
II(Q,z 1 1t = z 1) = R 1 (zQ I z 1)

if zQ :::; zm
if zm < zQ < z 1

(13)

Given (12) and (13), we now establish, in Theorem 2, two basic properties of E[II(Q,z1lt)J that we use in
Section 5 when analyzing the first-period decision problem. The proof is provided in the appendix.
THEOREM 2. (a) Given Zt, E[II(Q,z1)] is non-decreasing and concave in Q.
(b) Given Q, if ilFz(x It= Zt)lilzt::; 0, then E[II(Q,zt)l is non-decreasing in Zt.

In Theorem 2(b), the condition that Fz(x It= Zt) be non-increasing in Zt is a natural one. It would be
satisfied, for example, if the relationship between market I demand and market 2 demand were such that
a larger realized demand in market I corresponded to a probabilistically larger demand in market 2. In
Section 4, we specify a construct relating E1 and Ez; and, in doing so, we identify conditions that assure
not only that Lemma 4, Condition (b) will be satisfied, but also that the condition in Theorem 2(b) will
be satisfied.

I9

Incorporatin g Foreign Exchange Risk
As indicated in the introduction, one potential application Of the modeling approach presented in this
paper is the global newsvendor problem. In such an application, a risk arises due to fluctuations in
foreign exchange rates. In this subsection, we introduce a method for modeling foreign exchange risk
that preserves the validity of Theorem 2. Like Kouvelis and Gutierrez (1997), we assume that the
foreign exchange rate can be observed before the recourse decisions are made.

Suppose market 2 is in a country foreign to the home country (where market 1 is in the home country)
so that demand for market 2 is a function of the selling price, when the selling price is stated in units of
the foreign currency. Thus, if P2 is set in the currency of the home country, say US$, then demand for
market 2 is determined after first converting p2 into the foreign currency: D(p2,e2) = a2- b2(T]p2) + e2,
where T] denotes the random foreign exchange rate. If we Jet ~2 =b2T], then this demandfunct ion is
equivalent to the demand function used previously for market 2 (D(p2,e2) = a2 - ~2P2 + e2) except that
the slope of the function becomes a random variable that is realized prior to the determination of P2·
What we find is that this complication adds computationa l complexity to the recourse problem, but it
does not affect the analytical properties stated in Theorem 2:
THEOREM 3. Let D(pz,e2,~ 2 ) = a2 - ~ 2p2 + e2 denote the demand function for market 2, wbere e2 and ~2
are random variables and ~ 2 is independent of fJ. Suppose that ~2 is realized prior to
setting the market 2 decision policy and that e2 is realized after setting the policy. Then:
(a) Given z~, E[Il(Q,z1)] is non-decreasin g and concave in Q.
(b) Given Q, if oF2(X It= Zi)lozl:::; 0, then E[il(Q,zl)] is non-decreasin g in ZJ.

Summary and General Applicability of the Recourse Analysis

In Section 3, we demonstrated a solution procedure to assure that the recourse problem can be solved
optimally after information obtained from market I is used to generate the distribution used to
characterize the uncertainty in market 2 demand. The analysis resulted in a solution that could take any
one of five forms depending on the realized capacity level of the second-choice supplier. Then, because
the expected optimal recourse profit cannot be determined until information is made available at the
conclusion of the first selling season, we established analytical properties of the expected optimal
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recourse profit in expectation of the infonnation that might be obtained. Finally, by fonnulating a
model in which a foreign exchange rate can be absorbed into a price-dependent demand function, we
demonstrated the applicability of the recourse model as an extension to the global newsvendor problem.

Although the primary purpose of Section 3 is to provide a building block for analyzing and
understanding the two-period problem with learning introduced in Section 2, we find that it has more
general applicability. In particular, Section 3 provides a fonnulation, solution, and interpretation of a
three-supplier generalization of a news vendor problem with pricing. The three suppliers are such that
the first-choice supplier has a predetermined capacity constraint that is fixed, the second-choice supplier
has a pre-determined capacity constraint that is generated randomly, and the last-choice supplier has
unlimited capacity. This three-supplier construct, however, can be reinterpreted as a single-supplier
construct in which the cost function of purchasing from the supplier is piecewise linear and convex in
the amount of units procured. This is a useful reinterpretation because the stocking-quantity solution for
a newsvendor who faces such a purchasing-cost function, but does not have the liberty of setting a
selling price, is known to be a finite, generalized base-stock policy, which is a policy that is
characterized by a sequence of order-up to levels (one for each segment of the piecewise linear cost
function) and by the property that the optimal stocking quantity is an increasing furiction of the initial
inventory level (Porteus, 1990). Theorem I expands this result: Fora newsvendor who does have the
liberty of setting a selling price, the characteristics of a finite, generalized base-stock policy apply not
only to the optimal stocking quantity, but also to the optimal stocking factor, which incorporates the
affects of pricing. Thus, another contribution of the recourse model is the generalization of the results
of a newsvendor model in which the purchasing cost is piecewise linear and convex to include the case
in which demand is price-dependent and pricing is a decision variable.

4

RELATING E1 AND E2 AND THE TRANSFER OF INFORMATION BETWEEN MARKETS

From Lemma 4, the tractability of the solution procedure analyzed in Section 3 to determine the optimal
recourse policy is based on the assumption that Fz(xjt), which cannot be constructed until t is obtained,
is such that ag2(xjt)/dx + 2gz(xjti > 0, where gz(xjt) = fz(xjt)/[1 - Fz(xjt)]. In addition, from Theorem 2,
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the result that E[II(Q,z1)] is non-decreasing in z 1 is based on the assumption that aF2Cx I t = z 1)/ilz1 ~ 0.
For the purpose of completing the recourse analysis, we assumed that these properties exist. However,
these are hardly superfluous assumptions since the form of F2Cxlt) can differ depending on whether t
represents full information or censored information. Therefore, to test the validity of these assumptions,
we introduce a specific framework in this section to link markets 1 and 2. Applying the framework,
then, we identify conditions to assure F2C-It) will inherit the desired properties.
Suppose that c1 and c2 are related in some fashion, but either the relationshi p between c1 and c2 is an
uncertain one, or inherent noise exists in one or both of the two market demand structures. In other
words, suppose that the scenario is such that some degree of uncertainty will always be present in
market 2, regardless of what is observed in market 1. As a result, even if the realized value of c 1 can be
observed, it cannot be used to resolve all uncertainty embedded in e2; it could be used only to recharacterize c2. And, to complicate the informational dynamics further, there is no guarantee that the
realized value of c 1 will be observed in the first place: if no leftovers occur in market 1, then only a
lower bound for the realized value of c 1 will be observed.
To operationalize this construct, let c1 and c2 be drawings from the same distribution, but suppose that
distribution includes an unknown parameter, e. Then the distribution from which c1 and c2 are drawn,
say <I>Cxle), is a conditional one that depends on a given value for e. Since e is unknown, we assign
h 0(e), a subjective density function, to characterize e prior to the start of the first selling season. As a
result, f\ (x) = I <I>(x I e)h (e)de. Then, given t, ho(e) can be updated to hJ(elt) using Bayes' formula
~

0

.

and F2Cxlt) can be constructed accordingly.
A technical difficulty of this approach is that, in general, the specific form ofh 1(elt) and consequently,
the specific form of F2Cxlt), depends. on the type of information obtained from the first selling season. In
particular, it depends on whether t

=x 1 (full information) or t =z 1 (censored information).

Thus, a

weakness of the Bayesian approach is that it might hinder tractability: in general, the conditions
specified in Lemma 4(b) and Theorem 2(b) must be satisfied for two different functional forms.
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However, this weakness can be overcome if cl>(xiB) belongs to the family of "newsboy distributions"
(Braden and Freimer, 1991). A newsboy distribution is defined as folJows: cl>(xiB) = 1- e·Sn(x), where
n(x) is increasing in x. When a newsboy distribution is paired with an h0(9) that is a member of the
exponential family of densities, F2(xlt) shares the same structural form with FI(x), regardless of whether
hi(Bit) is updated from at that represents fulJ or censored information. For example, Braden and
Freimer demonstrate that if cl>(xiB) = 1- e·exl. (a WeibulJ distribution) and if h 0 (9) =

[~atr(a)]Ba-Ie·~ (a

gamma density function), then:

I-1) (x)

~ )a
=( ~+xt..

(14)

(15)

and
(16)

Notice that F2(x It= XI) has the same form as FI(x); the only difference is that F 2(x It= XI) includes a+
I in place of a and~+ x/ in place of~- Similarly, F2(x It= z 1) is equivalent to F 1(x) except that~+
z/ replaces ~-

This example suggests that, with suitable restrictions on the parameters of the newsboy-gamma pair,
F2(xjt) can be assured to inherit the properties required for the validity of Lemma 4(b) and Theorem
2(b). Theorem 4 specifies such restrictions.
THEOREM 4.

Ifcl>(xjB) =I- e·Sn(x) and ho(B) = [~atr(a)]Ba-Ie-~8, then d2ri(x)/dx2 ~ 0 and a> V2 together
imply that ilg2(xjt)/ilz + Zg2(xjti > 0 and iiF2(x I t = ZI)/ilzi ~ 0.

Thus, to assure that the conditions in Lemma 4(b) and Theorem 2(b) wiiJ be satisfied after t is obtained
from market I, it suffices to have h0(9) be a gamma density with a ~ V2 and cl>(xj9) be a newsboy
distribution with a convex n(x). Note that the WeibulJ distribution has n(x) = x\ which is convex for A.
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2: 1. Note also that the sufficiency conditions stated in Theorem 4 are the same conditions that would be

applicable if the market :2 decision problem were an independent, single-period problem with a
distribution function for E2 that was of the form (14). Finally, it is important to note that even with the
restrictions stated in Theorem 4, the newsboy-gamma pair provides a great deal of flexibility for
approximating a wide range of empirical sales data.

5

ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST-PERIOD PROBLEM

Given the results of Sections 3 and 4, we now are ready to analyze (1), the first-period decision problem,
which is to determine (p 1*,S 1*,Q*), the first-period decisions, given that information obtained from
market 1 will be transferred to market 2 and that an optimal policy then will be followed in market 2.

We begin the analysis by making the observation that although both PI and

sl influence the optimal

expected recourse profit, they do so in a prescribed way. In particular, the links between (p 1, S 1) and the
recourse decisions can be captured completely through Z1 = S1 + b1P1 - a~o the market 1 stocking factor.
We exploit this observation by recasting the first-period decision problem in terms of z~o

p~o

that p 1 can be solved myopically (alternatively, we could recast the problem in terms of z~o
and then solve for sl myopically). To demonstrate, we define AI (Zj) =
number of leftovers in market 1. Then, we substitute forS1

r:J Fl (Xj)dxl

and Q so

S~o

and Q;

as the expected

=a1 - b1p1 + Z1 in (1) and re-write the fust-

period decision problem as follows:
(17)

where,
(18)

and
NQ (Q,z1) =-c 1Q + E[II(Q,z 1)]

(19)

Thus, the first-period decision problem is separable in PI and Q. As a result, ifz1 were fixed, then P1*lzl
could be found by maximizing Np(p~oz 1 ) and Q*jz1 could be found by maximizing NQ(Q,z 1). This
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observation leads to Lemma 6, which specifies the optimal first-period decisions as unique functions of
a pre-detennined stocking factor for market 1. The proof is in the appendix.
LEMMA6.

The optimal first-period decisions can be detennined uniquely as functions of ZJ as
follows:

(c)

Q* I ZJ

=Q(zJ) satisfies:

From Lemma 6, if a value of Z1 is given, then P1* and S1* can be detennined explicitly. And, although
the detennination ofQ1*jz1* requires solving an implicit function, efficient computational techniques
can be employed because the solution to this implicit function is unique. Moreover, this implicit
function has intuitive appeal: For a given ZJ. Q 1* is the value of Q that equates expected marginal
revenue (ilE[TI(Q,zJ)]/oQ) with expected marginal cost (cJ); if expected marginal revenue is strictly less
than expected marginal cost for all Q, then Q1 *lz1 = 0.

As a result of Lemma 6, the problem of detennining (p 1*,S 1*,Q*), the optimal decision vector for the
first selling period, reduces to an optimization problem over z1:
(20)

That is, the two-period decision problem with recourse, which includes as many as seven decisions
(including recourse decisions) can be transformed into a single-decision problem. In particular, the
problem reduces to a search for z 1*, the optimal stocking factor for market 1. Then, given z 1*, all
optimal decisions can be detennined: (pJ*,S 1*,Q*), the first-period decisions, can be detennined
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immediately from Lemma 6; and (pz*,qt*,qtz*,qz*) can be detennined from Theorem 1 after the first
selling period concludes and tis collected.
We have had little success identifying general analytical conditions under which Np(p 1(z 1),zt) +
NQ(Q(zt),Zt) is sufficiently well-behaved so as to guarantee that Zt * can be found using simple search
algorithms. Nevertheless, since we have reduced the two-period decision problem with recourse to a
single-variable model, even a worst-case scenario involving an exhaustive search can be performed
fairly painlessly, given the widespread accessibility of capable computing technology . And, under
suitable conditions identified below, an accessible lower bound can be detennined to reduce the search
domain for Zt*· This lower bound correspond s to the myopic optimal stocking factor for market 1.
To demonstrate, first define Zsp as the optimal stocking factor for market I if the first-selling period were
treated as a single-period problem. Then, Zsp = argmax{Np(p1(z1),z 1)}. From Petruzzi and Dada
(1999a), Zsp can be found efficiently for the general class of distributions that satisfy dg 1(x)/dx + 2g1(xi

> 0, where g 1(x) = ft(x)/[1- Ft(x)] is the hazard rate function associated with 1:: 1. Theorem 5 establishes
that Zsp is a lower bound for z1* if the relationship between market 1 and market 2 is such that Theorem
4 applies. The proof is in the appendix.

This conclusion is an intuitive one for two reasons. The first reason is a straightforw ard one: A higher
stocking factor corresponds to a higher number of expected leftovers. Since there is a potential second
opportunity to sell leftovers when recourse exists, leftovers have less of an "overage" cost associated
with them in the two-period scenario than they do in the single-period scenario. The second reason
requires more explanation, but briefly stated: A higher stocking factor increases the likelihood of

learning about the uncertainty associated with demand. Since there is an opportunity to exploit learned
information only when recourse exists, learning is more valuable in the two-period scenario than it is in
the single-period scenario.
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To explore more fully the meaning of learning in this context, consider the following comparison to a

full-infonnation variant of the two-period decision problem with recourse. (In what follows, we hold Q
constant to simplify the comparative analysis.) Suppose that it somehow were possible to observe the
realized value of c1 regardless of whether or not leftovers occur in market I. Then, no matter what
happens in market I, t = x 1 and the distribution for Ez can be constructed from full information.
Accordingly, the expected profit associated with market 2 (taken at the beginning of period I) would be:

where the subscript "F' identifies this as the full-information case. Note that llp(Q It= X1 < z1) in (2I)
is equivalent to ll(Q,z1 It= x1) in (2). Note also that llp(Q It= x 1 <:: z1) in (2I) is independent of ZJ.
This is because, with full information, the distribution for Ez is Fz(xlx 1); and since x 1 <:: ZJ. there are no
leftovers available to transfer to market 2. Next, Theorem 6 establishes that, if Theorem 4 applies, then
the optimal first-period stocking factor in the censored-information scenario is no less than the optimal
first-period stocking factor in a comparable full-information scenario. The proof is in the appendix.
THEOREM 6.

Let ZJF* denote the optimal market I stocking factor in the full-information variant. If
aFz(X It= ZJ)/azl s; 0, then ZJ* <:: ZJp*.

· Thus, whereas Theorem 5 indicates thatinventory recourse (the opportunity to stock leftovers for
possible sale in a subsequent period) results in a higher stocking factor than when no recourse exists,
Theorem 6 indicates that information recourse (the opportunity to obtain information otherwise
unavailable when leftovers occur) results in an even higher stocking factor.

This can be explained as follows. When full information is guaranteed regardless of the operating
decisions implemented, then information is free in the sense that no proactive measures are required for
learning to occur. However, if full information is not guaranteed, then it must be "purchased." The
"purchase price" of this information is a higher ZJ*· That is, when information is subject to censoring, a
higher z1* represents a short-term cost because a higher z1* corresponds to a higher number of expected
leftovers; but, in return, the higher z 1* increases the opportunity to learn in the sense that it increases the
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likelihood that information otherwise unobservable can be obtained (e.g., if z 1 is increased to z,', then
learning occurs if z 1 ::; x 1 < z 1', where x 1 denotes the realized value of e,). This phenomenon of
"paying" for information through an increase in short-term leftovers is related to a similar phenomenon
observed by Lariviere and Porteus (1999). They find that, for the case of a perishable product and an
exponential underlying demand distribution (that is not price dependent), the optimal stocking quantity
in a multi-period planning horizon with censored updating is greater than or equal to the optimal
stocking quantity in a single-period horizon.

It is extremely intuitive that information is valuable and hence, "learning" comes at a cost (e.g., higher

short-term leftovers). However, by comparing a censored-information scenario to a full-information
scenario, we find that the idea of learning in our context is based not so much .on what occurs (the
revision of a distribution), but rather on how it occurs (through the use of censored information).
Moreover, since Lemma 6(a) implies that dp, */dz, * = [1 - F, (ZJ *)]!2b, > 0, which implies that a higher
z 1* results in a higher p 1*, we also find that a portion of the learning cost is passed on to the consumer
when demand uncertainty is additive.

6

CONCLUSION

In this paper we developed a comprehensive approach for analyzing pricing and inventory decisions in a
two-period retail setting when an opportunity to refine information about uncertain demand is available.
One contribution of the analysis is the solution procedure: we show that all decisions (up to seven in all,
including recourse decisions) can be determined uniquely if the first-period stocking factor is known.
Hence, as for the most general single-period model considered by Petruzzi and Dada (1999a), the twoperiod decision problem with recourse reduces to a search, albeit a more complex one, for one decision
variable. A second contribution of the analysis is the policy implications: we find that the cost of
learning is (1) a consequence of censored information because, on the margin, learning is free if full
information is guaranteed; (2) measured in the form of a higher stocking factor; and (3) shared with the
consumer in the form of a higher selling price when demand uncertainty is additive. A third
contribution of the analysis is the application of the results to the motivating examples that highlight the
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natural role of information gathered in one market to enhance decision making in other related )llarkets
separated in time or space.· In the remainder of this section, we return to these examples to demonstrate
the scope of our model.

Our model applies directly to Example 1, thus solving optimally for the stocking and pricing decisions
relevant to a prevalent case in market research, namely the case of using a single test market prior to a
widespread launch (Lilien et a!., 1992). However, market research involving multiple test markets may
be more appropriate for retailers who wish to learn about demand, depending on the situation. Based in
part on that motivation, Fisher and Rajaram developed a model to exploit (I) historical patterns to select
a subset of markets as test markets and (2) test-market-demand information to revise forecasts for the
overall selling season. Their analysis introduces some of the difficulties that arise in empirical settings,
particularly if censoring is an issue. Lariviere and Porteus (1999) address censoring, but they focus on
the important special case of perishable inventory and pre-determined prices. And, Little ( 1966), to
whom the notion of using multiple markets to collect good information to be used over time can be
traced, operationalized promotion level instead of selling price as a control variable affecting demand.

As the analyses of Fisher and Rajaram, Lariviere and Porteus, and Little suggest, the implementation of
exact mathematical models to market research problems involving multiple test sites can be quite
challenging. Our research supports this. Nevertheless, the tWo-period decision problem with recourse
studied in this paper can be extended in principle to supplement such work. This is because the recourse
analysis of Section 3 would continue to apply even if multiple test markets were used in period 1. The
only two adjustments to Section 3 would be: (I) the realized capacity constraint of the second-choice
supplier would depend on the sum of leftovers remaining from the first period, and (2) the distribution
constructed to characterize E2 would depend on the vector of information collected from the first period.
Generally speaking, the construction technique introduced in Section 4 is no more difficult conceptually
when t is a vector instead of a scalar. Moreover, it can be shown that the properties of Theorem 2 and 3
continue to hold when

Zt

is a vector instead of a scalar. As a result, the analysis of this paper still could

be applied to reduce a two-period, multiple-test-site decision problem with recourse to a search for first-
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period stocking factors, although finding an exact solution to the problem would be substantially more
complex computationally because the search would be for an optimal decision vector.
Our model also applies directly to Example 2, thus solving a fairly comprehensive generalization of a
global newsvendor problem introduced by Kouvelis and Gutierrez (1997). In particular, our
generalization incorporates (1) retail pricing, (2) learning from censored sales information, and (3) an
option to pool purchasing resources. We find that a key to applying our model to this example is the
transformation of foreign exchange risk into uncertainty surrounding the slope of the price-dependent
demand function. This transformation is possible because we follow the lead of Kouvelis and Gutierrez
and assume that the exchange rate is realized at the start of the recourse period.
While our model also applies directly to the two-period version of Example 3, we find that a direct
extension to longer horizons would be quite challenging. To understand why this is so, consider the role
that the stocking factor plays in defining the statistic t. Uncertainty in demand in a given period
determines not only how much stock is transferred, but also the nature of the information that is
transferred (full vs. censored). These informational dynamics create the stumbling block: although the
pricing decision for any given period could be localized once a (recourse) distribution is constructed, the
construction of such a distribution would depend on the entire history oft's from earlier periods.
This is in sharp contrast to a related model considered by Petruzzi and Dada (1998b). In that model,
demand is not stochastic, although uncertainty exists because a parameter of the price-dependent
demand curve is unknown to the decision maker. Once the unknown parameter is revealed, which
occurs in a multi-period horizon the first time that leftovers occur, demand becomes deterministic. As a
result, the entire history oft's is not required to construct the distribution to characterize a given
period's e. Instead, only the most recent tis sufficient. This result leads to a backward-substitution
algorithm that reduces all stocking and pricing decisions over the multi-period horizon to a singlevariable search. However, numerical experience with that model suggests that the effect of future
periods on the current decisions diminish rapidly as the planning horizon grows.
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Given this insight, one application for the two-period model analyzed in this paper is as a rollinghorizon approximation to a multiple period setting. This approximation then could be improved with
the addition of a suitable reward at the end of the second period to adjust for the impact of remaining
periods that are dropped. It would be interesting to determine whether this reward could be chosen such
that it provides bounds on the performance of the resulting optimal policy. Another promising avenue
for extending the two-period analysis to longer horizons would be to reduce the complexity of the
informational dynamics, for example, by finding a mechanism for obtaining full information. One way
of obtaining such information would be to use an emergency supplier to fill all unmet demand at the end
of each period (as in Eeckhoudt et al., 1995).

APPENDIX: PROOFS

LEMMA2. Let 11. 2 (z 2 1t) =

J;

2

F2 (x 2 1t)dx 2 and suppose that Sz were given (which, from Lemma 1,

implies given values for qh q 12, and qz). Then, from (5) and (7):
Sz -ll.z(zzlt)-bz(pz +hz)Fz(zzlt)

aR(pz,qi,q12,q2lt)

.

apz

= z 2 + a 2 -11. 2 (z 2 It)- b 2h 2F2 (z 2 It)- b 2 [1 + F2 (z 2 1t)]p 2

2
a R(p2,ql,ql2,q21 t)

ap/
So, for a given S2, R(Pz,q 1,q12,q2 l t) is concave iii pz. Therefore, Pz* can be determined as the unique
solution to the implicit function aR(p2,qJ,qJ2,q2 I t)/apz

=0, if a value of Sz is given:

Notice, Pz* is written solely as a function of zz. Thus, from (7), we can also write:

11. 2 (z 2 lt)+(a 2 +b 2h 2 +z 2 )F2 (z 2 1t)
t + z 2 =--''-'-"-'-..:..--'-"---"'-"--..=.!.-"-'-"-~
t =a 2 - b 2P2 ( z2 I)
S 2(z2 I)
1+ F2 (z 2 1t)
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LEMMA3. To prove this lemma, it suffices to show that aSz(z2it)tazz > 0. Thus, from Lemma 2(b):
as2 (zzl t) 2Fz (zzlt) + (az + bzhz +zz )fz (zzl t)
l+Fz(Zzlt)
az2

[Az (zzl t) + (az + bzhz +zz )Fz (zzlt)}z (z 2it)
[l+Fz(zzi t)f

_ 2F2 (z 21t)[l+Fz(z 2it)]+(a 2 +b 2h 2 +z 2 -A 2 (z 21t))f2 (z 21t)
[1 + Fz (z2lt)f
-

> 0

2

The inequality follows because z 2 - A 2 (z2lt) = J~ [1- F2 (xlt)}lx > 0.

LEMMA 4. To prove this lemma, it suffices to show that M(z2lt) = ci + h2 (for j = 0, 12, 2) has a unique
solution and that, at that solution, M(z2lt) is decreasing in zz. Thus, from (7) and the proof of Lemma 3:
apz(Z2it) =-1 ( 1 aS2(zzlt) )=-1 (l- 2F2(z2lt)+ b2(P2(z2l t)+h2)f2(z zlt)J
.
1+ Fz (z2it)
b2
az2
b2
azz
=

]
)g
(p
1-F2(z21t) r
]ll-b2 2(z2it)+h2 2(z21t)
·
b 2 1+F2 (z 21t)

.

r

where gz(zzlt) = fz(zzlt)/[1 - Fz(zzit)]. Therefore:

= [1- F2 (z I t)l b:
=

b2

~:~~~~~:~t)]

( F2~z2lt)
1+

)(p2 (z2lt)+ h2 )g 2 (z2lt)]

r1+F1 (z It)i(l-F2(z2 it)f -2b2M(zzlt)g2(z21t)]
2 2

and hence:

a2 M(z 21t)
azl aM(zzit)
azz

[r

0

agza Cz2lt)]
·
-2 I ] ,I- Fz (z2It) )f2 (z21t) + b2M(z2it)
r
z2
b 2 tl+F2 (z 2 t)
.
2
ag2(z21t)] .
))
(1-F2(zzlt
I)
(
))2
I
(
F
[2(1
- 2 z2 t · g2 z2 t +
]
= r
az2
g2 (z21t)
b2l1 + Fz (z21t)
-1

[ag2Cz2lt) 2 ( z2 It )2] < 0
-[1-F2(z21t)f
+ g2
L
r
az
b2tl+F2(z 2it)jg2(z2 it)
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This inequality implies that M(z2lt) has no local minimum and, at most, one local maximum. In
addition, from Lemma 2(a): pz(Oit) = a:zfbz and pz(z-7oo It) < oo. Th?s, for j = 0, 12, and 2, M(Oit) =

a:zfbz + hz > Cz + hz;?; Cj + hz and M(z-7oo I t) = 0 < Cj + hz. Therefore, for j = 0, 12, and 2: M(zziO = Cj +
hz has exactly one solution and, at that solution, M(zzlt) is decreasing in z.

LEMMA 5. We consider three cases separately.

Case I: Assume Sz(zzlt) < 0
In this case, from Lemma 1: qi(zzlt) = Sz(zzlt) and q!2(zzlt) = qz{zzlt) =0. Thus, from Lemma 3, the
supply constraint qi(zzlt) :'> Q implies the constraint zz :'> ZQ and therefore, the optimization problem (10)
can be written as follows:
(A1)
z 2 ::; zQ

s.t.

Consider, from Lemma 2 and the definition of M(zzlt) given in Lemma 4:
<JR ~ (z 2lt) =
z2

(p 2 (z 21t)- c 0 )as~(z 2lt) (p 2 (z 21t) + h 2 )F2 (z2lt) + [s2 (z2lt)- A 2 (z 21t)]<Jp 2 (z 2lt)
·

<Jz 2

z2

::l.-. 2 (z21t)J
-- (p 2 (z2It ) -co ) <JS2 (z2lt) (p 2 (zzIt) + h2 n:,
r2 (z 2It)[ 1- b 2 ~vp:..=:...;'-=-'-

~2

~2

= [M(zzlt)- (co+ h2)]dSz (zzlt)
<Jz 2
From the proof of Lemma 3, dSz(zzlt)ldzz > 0. Therefore, a necessary condition for z2 to be an interior
maximum of RI(zzJt) is M(zzlt) = co + hz. But, given Lemma 4, this condition is sufficient because
M(zzJt) =co+ hz has exactly one solution, and this solution indeed corresponds to the unconstrained
maximum of RI(zzJt). Thus, given that ZI is the unique solution to M(zzJt) =co+ hz, <JR1(z2 Jt)/dzz> 0 if
and only if Zz < ZJ. This implies that the solution to (A1) is min {ZI,ZQ}.
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Case II: Assume 0 < S,fz,ltl < 0 + L1
In this case, from Lemma 1: qJ(zzlt) = Q, q!2(zzl0 = Sz(zzit)- Q, and qz(zzlt) = 0. Thus, from the
corollary to Lemma 1, the supply constraint qn(zzlt) 5 L1 implies the constraint zz 5 ZQ+L and therefore,
the optimization problem (10) can be written as follows:

S.t.

Zz 5 ZQ+L

Given Q, the structure of this problem is analogous to the structure of (AI). Thus, by analogy, the
solution to this problem is min {zn,ZQ+d, where zu is the unique solution to M(z2lt) = c12 + h2.
Case III: Assume 0 + L1 < S,Cz2!t)

In this case, Lemma 1: q1(z2lt) = Q, q!2(zzlt) = Lh and q2Cz2lt)

=Sz(z2lt)- Q- L1.

Thus, the

optimization problem (1 0) can be written as follows:

Given Q and Lh this problem also is analogous to (AI), except there is no supply constraint. Therefore,
by analogy, the solution to this problem is zm, where zm is the unique solution to M(zzlt) = c2 + h2.

THEOREM2. PART (a). Given z 1 and xh the realized value of Eh there are two cases: t = x 1 ifx 1 is

observable and t = z 1 if x 1 is not observable. The details of the proof are analogous for both cases; thus,
we provide them only for the case in which t = XJ.
First notice, from the definition of ZQ (Theorem 1, 2"d step) and from Lemma 3:
dZQ

=[dSz(Zzlt=~1)
dZz

dQ

l-1 >0
Zz=ZQ

Likewise, since t = x 1 implies that L1

=z1 -

x 1:
1
]- >O

dzQ+z1-x1 =[aS2(z 2 1t=x1)

dQ

dZz

z2=ZJ-XJ
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Thus, for a given z~, as Q increases, both ZQ and ZQ+zi-•I increase. However, ZJ, zu, and zm all are
independent of Q. ·As a result, (12) implies that as Q increases, IT(Q,ziit =XI) progresses from
Rm(zmlxi) to Rn(2:t~+zi-•IIxi) to Ru(znlxi) to RI(zdxi) to RJ(ZJixi). Therefore, it is a straightforward,
though tedious, exercise to show that IT(Q,z 1lt = x,) is continuous in Q.
Next, consider, from Lemma 5 and Theorem 1:
ilRm(zm I xi)
=c2 -co
ilQ
.
ilRn(ZQ+z,-x,l xl)
= M(zQ+z,-x, It= x 1)- (c 0 + h 2 )
ilQ
ilR 11 (zn I x 1)
=cl2 -co
ilQ.
ilR 1 (zQ I x 1)
=M(zQ It =x 1 )-(c 0 +h 2 )
ilQ
ilRI(Z] I X])
ilQ

0

·As ZQ+z 1-x 1 -7 zm from above, ilRn(ZQ+z1-x 1lx,)/ilQ -7 M(zmlt = x,)- (co+ hz) = Cz- co= ilRm(zmlx,)lilQ.
This implies that iliT(Q,z1lt = x 1)/ilQ is continuous at the value of Q that is such that ZQ+zi-•I = Zm.
Similarly, as ZQ+z 1-xi -7 Zn from below, ilRn(ZQ+zi·x1lx,)/ilQ -7 ilRn(zulxi)/ilQ; as ZQ -7 zn from above,
ilRJ(ZQIXI)/ilQ -7 ilRn(znlx,)/ilQ; and as ZQ -7 ZJ from below, ilRu(zdx,)/ilQ -7 ilRI(ZIIx,)/ilQ. Therefore,
IT(Q,ziit =XI) is differentiable for all Q.
Note also, from the proof of Lemma 4, that although M(zzlt = XJ) may first increase for small values of
Zz, the equation M(zzlt) = c 2 + h 2 has exactly one solution. Consequently, M(zzlt = x 1) must begin its

descent in zz at a value of zz that is less than zm. Moreover, once M(zzlt =.XI) begins decreasing ill Zz, it
remains decreasing in Zz, which implies that M(zzlt = x1) is decreasing for all Zz 2: zm.
We now can piece together the shape of I1(Q,z1lt = x 1). As Q increases from 0 to the critical value at
which ZQ+z 1-x1 = Zm, I1(Q,z1lt =XI) increases linearly at a rate of Cz- eo. Then, as Q increases from the
critical value at which ZQ+z,-x1 = zm to the critical value at which ZQ+zi·•J = zn, the rate of change of
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Il(Q,ziif= XI) is M(ZQ+z1.x 1lt =XI)- (co+ hz). But since (1) ZQ+z1-x 1 ;:: zm, (2) M(zzlt .=XI) is decreasing
in zz for zz;:: zm, and (3) dZQ+z1-x/dQ > 0, the rate of change of Il(Q,ziit =XI) decreases from M(zmlt =
XI)- (co+ hz) = cz- co to M(znlt =XI)- (co+ hz) = c12- co as Q increases such that ZQ+z1.x 1 increases
from zm to zn. In other words, in this region, Il(Q,ziit =XI) continues to increase as a function of Q, but .
at a decreasing rate. Next, for Q that is such that ZQ+z1.,1 > Zn, but ZQ < zn, IT(Q,ziJt = x 1) increases
linearly at a rate of c12 - co as Q increases. Then, as Q increases from the critical value at which ZQ = zn
to the critical value at which ZQ = z~, Il(Q,zlit = XJ) continues to increase, but again it increases at a
decreasing rate until the rate equals 0. From then on, for all Q that is such that ZQ >z~, IT(Q,z1jt = x 1)
remains constant. In summary:, IT(Q,ziit =XI) is non-decreasing and concave in Q for the case t = x1.
The details are analogous for the case t = z1; hence, IT(Q,zllt = z 1) also is continuous, differentiable, nondecreasing, and concave in Q. Thus, from (2): E[IT(Q,zi)], the unconditional optimal expected profit of
the recourse problem, is a convex combination of functions that are continuous, differentiable, nondecreasing, and concave in Q. Therefore E[IT(Q,zi)] possesses those same properties.
PART

(b). Given Q, we again consider two cases: t =XI and t = z 1. Unlike in PART (a), however, we

approach each case differently, applying an algebraic analysis to the case t = x 1 and a probabilistic
analysis to the case t = z 1.
Ift = Xh then L 1 = z1- XI> 0, but Fz(xjt = x1) is independent of ZJ. Thus, from Theorem 1, ZQ+z,-x, is
increasing in ZJ, but z~, zn, zm, and ZQ all are independent of ZJ. As a result, the form of IT(Q,z1jt =XI)
depends on the specific value of Q that is given. In particular, from (12):
• If the given value of Q is such that ZQ;:: z~, then Il(Q,ziJt = x1) = RI(ZijXJ) for all Z1 > x1; thus,
from Lemma 5, Il(Q,ziit =XI) is independent of ZI-

• If the given value of Q is such that ZI > ZQ > zu, then Il(Q,ziit =XI)= ~J(ZQIXI) for all ZJ > x1;
thus, from Lemma 5, Il(Q,ziit =XI) is independent of ZJ.

• If the given value of Q is such that Zn <:: ZQ > zm, then IT(Q,ziJt =XI) = Rn(ZQ+z,-x,lxi) for values
of Z1 that are greater than XJ, but less than the critical value of Z1 at which ZQ+z,-x, = zu; and
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IT(Q,zi!t =XI)= Rn(znlxi) for values of ZI that are greater than or equal to the critical value of
ZI at which ZQ+z.-x, = Zn. Thus, IT(Q,zi!t =XI) is continuous. Moreover, from Lemmas 5 and 4,
ClRn(ZQ+z 1-x 1lxi)/Clzi = M(ZQ+z,-x,lt =XI)- (Ciz + hz) :2: 0; and Rn(znlxi) is independent of ZI.
Thus, IT(Q,zi!t =XI) also is differentiable and non-decreasing in ZI.
• If the given value of Q is such that Zlll <: ZQ, then IT(Q,zi!t =XI) = Rlll(Zilllxi) for values of ZI
that are greater than XI. but less than or equal to the critical value of ZI at which ZQ+z,-x, = zlll;
IT(Q,zi!t =XI) = Rn(ZQ+z.-x,!xi) for values of ZI that are greater than the critical value of ZI at
which ZQ+z,-x, = Zlll, but less than the critical value of ZI at which ZQ+z,-x, = zu; and IT(Q,ziit =
XI) = Rn(znlxi) for values of ZI that are greater than or equal to the critical value of ZI at which
ZQ+z,-x, = zn. Thus, IT(Q,ziit =XI) is continuous. Moreover, from Lemmas 5 and 4,
ClRm(zm!xi)/Clzi = (cz- Ciz); ClRn(ZQ+z.-x 1IXI)/Clzi = M(ZQ+z,-x,lt =XI)- (Ciz + hz); and Rn(znlxi) is
independent of ZI. Thus, IT(Q,zi!t =XI) also is differentiable and non-decreasing in ZI.
In summary: IT(Q,zi!t =XI) is non-decreasing in ZI for any given Q.

If t = ZJ, then Fz(xlt = ZI) is non-increasing in ZI by assumption, but LI = 0 is independent of ZI. This
implies that the expected recourse profit, conditioned on the event that t = ZJ, depends on ZI only
through the distribution function used to characterize !:'z. Thus, for the purpose of this proof, let Eziz 1
denote the random variable associated with market 2 demand when F 2 (xlt = ZI) is the distribution
function used to characterize that random variable. Then, from (5), notice that for any given decision
vector (pz, qh qiz, qz), the expected profit associated with the recourse problem can be written as
· R(pz,qhqiz,qzlt = ZI) = E['l'(Ezjz1)], where'¥( Ezjz1)

=pz(qi+q12+qz)- (pz+hz)max{ (zz- Ezjz1),0}-

(coqi+cl2qiz+czqz). Notice that 'I'(Ezjz1) is a non-decreasing function of Ezjz1•
Now, consider two arbitrary values of ZJ, say ZIA and ZJB. Without loss of generality, let ZIB > ZIA·
Since ClF(xjt = ZI)/Clzi ::; 0, F(xjt = ZIB)::; F(xjt = ZIA). Thus, by definition, Zm is larger than ZIA in the

usual stochastic ordering, which implies that E['I'(Ez~z 18)] <: E['l'(Ezjz,A)] (Buzacott and Shanthikurnar,
1993). Therefore, if we define v = (p2,qhqiz,qz) as any decision vector for the recourse problem, then
R(v!ziB) = E['I'(Ezjz 18 )] <: E['I'(Ezjz 1A)] = R(vjziA). In addition, if we define vj* as the optimal decision
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vector for the recourse problem when Ezjz1; is the random variable associated with market 2 demand (j =
A, B), then, by the definition of Vs*, IT(Q,zlslt = ZJB) =R(va*lziB) <: R(vA *lzJB). Therefore, IT(Q,ziBit =
Z!B)

=R(vs*IZ!B);:: R(VA *lz!B);:: R(vA*IZ!A) =IT(Q,Z!Ait = Z!A). In summary: if aF(xlt = Z!)!OZ! s; 0,

then IT(Q,z1lt = z 1) is non-decreasing in Z1 for any given Q.
Since, for a given Q, both IT(Q,z 1lt = x1) and IT(Q,z1lt = ZJ) are non-decreasing in ZJ. (2) implies:

THEOREM 3. First condition on the event 132 = b2 and solve the conditional recourse problem as per

Theorem 1. As a consequence, if tlz = bz and t = min{zhxd, where x 1 denotes the realized value of e1
(whether observable or not), then a conditional expected optimal profit can be computed as a function of
Q and z1: IT(Q,zi It= min{xhzd; tlz = bz). Notice, IT(Q,ZI It= min{x~>zd; tlz = bz) is exactly the same
as IT(Q,z1 I t) from Section 3. Since j32 and e1 are independent, we can un-condition on t by integrating
over x 1 and thereby compute E[IT(Q,zi ltlz = bz)], which is exactly the same as E[IT(Q,z1)] from Section
3. Theorem 2 therefore implies that E[IT(Q,z1 1132 = bz)] is non-decreasing and concave in Q for a given
ZJ, and non-decreasing in z 1for a given Q (assuming that aFz(x I t = zi)/az 1 s; 0). Next, we can integrate
over b2 and thereby compute E[IT(Q,ZJ)], the unconditional expected profit. And, since E[IT(Q,z1)] is a
convex combination of functions that are {1) non-decreasing and concave in Q for a given ZJ. and (2)
non-decreasing in z1 for a given Q, the results of the theorem follow.

THEOREM 4. If <I>(xl9) = 1- e·en(x) and ho{9) = [j3a/I'(a)]9a·Ie·~, then F 1(x) = 1 - [j3/(j3+n(x))]a and:

hl(9lt=Xl)= ljl(xll9)ho(9) = fl3+n(Xl)r+l 9"e-Bfll+n(Xt)J
r(a+1)
fl(xl)
[1-<I>(z1 19)}1 0 (9)
1-F1 (z 1)

fl3 + n(zl)J' 9 a-le -B[f\+n(z1)]
r(a)

Thus:
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This implies:
(a.+l)n'(x)
f3+ n(x 1 ) + n(x)
a.n'(x)

2
2
Therefore, given that a.;;:: Yz and that n"(x) "'d n(x)/dx

og 2<xlt=x 1) 2 g <X I t = x )2 =
-="-"---:'---'-'-+
1
2

ox

og2(xlt=zl)

-="-'-:o-~"-+

ox

2g ( x I t = z )2 =
1
2

;;::

0:

·
ca.+I)n"(x) + (2a.+I}
- - 2 <X I t = x 1 )2 > 0
a.+l
f3+n(x 1)+n(x)
a.n"(x)
- - g 2 (x I t = z 1 )2 > 0
+ (2a.-l)
a.+l
f3+n(z 1 )+n(x)

and:

LEMMA 6. PARTS (a) and (b). Given (18), Np(p~oz 1 ) is the expected profit function of a single-period

newsvendor problem with pricing. From Petruzzi and Dada (1999a), then, Np(PJ.ZJ) is concave in p1;
thus, P1*lzl can be determined as the unique solution to oNp(p~ozJ)/opl = 0:

PART (c). From Theorem 2(a), E[IT(Q,z1)] is concave in Q for a given z 1. Thus, from (19), NQ(Q,z1) is
concave in Q. Moreover, from the proof of Theorem 2, for arbitrarily large values of Q, oE[IT(Q,z1)]/oQ
= 0, which implies that oNQ(Q,zl)/oQ =- c < 0. Therefore, given Z~o either Q*lz1 = 0 (boundary-point
maximum) or Q*lz1 satisfies oNQ(Q,z 1)/oQ = 0 (interior-point maximum).
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THEOREM 5. Assume that ilFz(xJz,)/ilz, ::;; 0. From (19):
dNQ(Q( z 1),z 1 )

--"---~

dz 1

=

CJNQ(Q(z1),z 1 )
ilz 1

+

ilNQ(Q(z 1),z 1 )dQ(z 1)
dz 1

ilQ(z1 )

·=

ilNQ(QCz 1),z1 )
ilz1

~

0

.

(A2)

is an interior~
. In (A2), [ilNQ(Q(z1),z1)/ilQ(z 1)][dQ(z,)/dz,] = 0 by complementary slackness: if Q(z1)
boundary-point
point maximu m of NQ(Q,z 1), then [ilNQ(Q(z,),z,)/ilQ(z,)] = 0 by definition; if Q(z1) is a
solution, then dQ(z 1)/dz1 = 0. And, ilNQ(Q(z,),z,)!ilz,

=CJE[I1(Q(z,),z1)]/ilz 1 ~ 0 because ilFz(xJz1)/ilz1 ::;;

0 implies, by Theorem 2(b), that ilE[Il(Q(z,),z,)]/ilz, ~ 0.
n ofz,p; (b)
Therefore, we have: (a) Zsp is the value of z, that maximizes Np(p,(z 1),z,), by the definitio
*; and (c)
z,* is the value of z 1 that maximizes Np(p 1(z,),z,) + NQ(Q,(z,),z,), by the definition of z 1
NQ(Q(z 1),z1) is non-decreasing in z" by (A2). These three points imply that z, *;:: Zsp·

THEOREM 6. Assume that ilF2(xJzl)/ilz,::;; 0. From (21):

But, from (2):

Thus:
The inequality follows because ilii(Q,z, J t =z,)lilz, ~ 0, from the proof of Theorem 2(b).
iJE[I1(Q,z 1)) ~ ilE[IIF( Q,zJ))
OZJ

OZJ

the fullwhich implies that z 1* ~ z 1p*, where z,F* denotes the optimal market 1 stqcking factor in
information variant.
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